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THE PROMISE OF PERSONALIZED MEDICINE:
REGULATORY CONTROLS AND TORT
INFLUENCES IN THE CONTEXT OF
PERSONALIZED RISKS AND BENEFITS
Randy J. Prebula*
INTRODUCTION
In choosing which drug to give a patient, healthcare providers frequently
must balance their understanding of the patient's symptoms and knowledge
of the possible conditions that these symptoms suggest, with the acceptance
that each possible drug candidate has known and hidden risks and benefits.
Given the vast differences in patients' height, weight, sex, and age, coupled
with the ways in which different drugs can be metabolized, enter the blood
stream, and work within the body, "physicians frequently must try different
medications at different dosages until they find the one that seems to work
best in a particular patient."' This current medical standard of trial and error
exposes patients to drugs that may or may not help treat their condition,2 and
may even cause them unexpected harm.
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1. Lars Noah, The Coming Pharmacogenomics Revolution: Tailoring Drugs To Fit
Patients' Genetic Profiles, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 5 (2002) (alluding to the trial and error
process by which physicians frequently must adjust drug doses based on "the nature of
their symptoms, progression of the underlying disease, presence of any concurrent
disease conditions or concomitant use of other medications, and tolerance of potential
side effects"); ERIC J. CASSELL, DOCTORING: THE NATURE OF PRIMARY CARE MEDICINE
70 (Oxford University Press 1997) (explaining how variation in characteristics and
responses between patients creates inherent uncertainty in the clinical management of
individuals).
2. Noah, supra note 1, at 6, citing John C. Ballin, Editorial, Who Makes the
Therapeutic Decisions?, 242 JAMA 2875, 2875 (1979) ("As every physician recognizes,
a drug may be the agent of choice for the majority of patients, but it is not necessarily the
best therapy for all patients. Individual pharmacologic responses and idiosyncrasies
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In response to these potential problems, and as a result of research into the
human genome, researchers began to develop and propose the introduction
of diagnostic tests aimed at detecting individual patient variation in genetic
make-up and expression, and to correlate these genetic characteristics to
specific drug therapies.4 While there is still considerable debate as to the
effectiveness of such tests, 5 the underlying premise is that they can detect an
individual patient's relevant genetic make-up and/or expression to help
predict his or her ability (or likelihood) of metabolizing drugs.6 These types
of tests also may help identify specific traits of diseases that may indicate
which patient will or will not benefit from a drug.7 Under either of these
approaches, these new pharmacogenomic (literally, "drug/genome") tests are
likely to provide significant opportunities to achieve the "true promise of
personalized medicine - the provision of individually safe and effective
treatment[s]."
require that a variety of similar agents be available.")). See also Grundberg v. Upjohn
Co., 813 P.2d 89, 99 (Utah 1991) (arguing that "[tlo determine whether a drug's benefit
outweighs its risk is inherently complex because of the manufacturer's conscious design
choices regarding the numerous chemical properties of the product and their relationship
to the vast physiologic idiosyncrasies of each consumer for whom the drug is designed");
see generally CASSELL, supra note 1.
3. Noah, supra note 1, at 6.
4. Teresa Kelton, Pharmacogenomics: The Re-Discovery Of The Concept Of
Tailored Drug Therapy And Personalized Medicine, 19 HEALTH LAW. 1, 3-4, 6-7 (2007);
Barbara Evans, Analyzing The Laws, Regulations, And Policies Affecting FDA-Regulated
Products: What Will It Take To Reap The Clinical Benefits Of Pharmacogenomics?, 61
Food & Drug L.J. 753, 753-54 (2006).
5. Carol Freund, Emerging Ethical Issues in Pharmacogenomics From Research to
ClinicalPractice, DIAGNOSTIC INNOVATION, Mar. 2003, at 15, 16; Deborah Levenson, Is
Warfarin Pharmacogenomic Testing Ready for Prime Time?, CLINICAL LAB. NEWS, July
28, 2008, at 1.
6. Margaret Crews, Pharmacogenomics: Tailoring the Drug Approval Process for
Designer Drugs, 24 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y, 363, 363 n. 4 (2008); Noah, supra
note 1, at 5.
7. Crews, supra note 6, at 363 n.4.
8. Randy J. Prebula, Personalized Medicine - The Ever-Evolving Role of
"Companion Diagnostics, " FDLI UPDATE, Sept. 2008, at I.
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By seeking to develop and offer such tests, medical device manufacturers,
clinical laboratories, and drug manufacturers, however, are shifting from
population-based risk/benefit analyses as to the utility of drug treatments to
identified patient subgroups and even individual patient risk/benefit
analyses.9 The significance of a pharmacogenomic test result, as well as its
applicability to the patient's individualized treatment, differs from the
traditional mechanism by which doctors balance a diagnostic result or a
clinical benefit across the studied patient population.' 0 This change in focus
with regard to both risks and benefits for personalized medicine tests will
impact the direct, administrative controls and indirect common law (tort)
influences by which such products are developed by manufacturers and
laboratories, regulated by U.S. federal agencies, marketed to doctors and
consumers, used by individual patients, and reviewed judicially in the
context of patient injury.
In addressing the shift in focus from populations to individuals, this Note
will: (1) provide a brief overview of the scope of personalized medicine; and
(2) consider the interplay between diagnostic device manufacturers, clinical
laboratories, and doctors in their caretaker relationship with patients. Then,
it will further assess how each, in turn, impacts (a) the
regulatory/administrative controls, and (b) tort influences impacting how
pharmaceutical drugs are manufactured and distributed, with the goal of
understanding how personalized medicine regulation can aid in bringing
individualized medical benefits to fruition.
I. PHARMACOGENOMICS - A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME
Just as in law, an effective discussion of scientific and medical methods
requires an understanding of the relevant terms of art. Within the context of
genetics and the use of genetic information to identify individual patient
characteristics, these terms and phrases, while maddeningly similar, carry
important distinctions. As a brief primer, we start with genes-the specific
9. EUR. MED. AGENCY, COMM. FOR HUM. MED. PROD., REFLECTION PAPER ON
PHARMACOGENOMICS IN ONCOLOGY 1, 4, 8, 10 (2008), available at
http://www.emea.europa.eu/pdfs/human/pharmacogenetics/12843506endraft.pdf; see also
In Vitro Diagnostic Multivariate Index Assays (IVDMJA): Pub. Meeting of U.S. Food and
Drug Admin. (Feb. 8, 2007) (statement of Gail Javitt), at 107 [hereinafter Javitt
Statement], available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/O6dO347/06d-0347-
tr00001-0l .pdf.
10. Javitt Statement, supra note 9, at 111.
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sequences of DNA present on pairs of chromosomes within our cells."
Each of the approximately 20,000 to 25,000 genes in a man 12 has a normal,
or common, sequence of DNA bases strung like spiky beads on a twisted
chain of sugars. This genetic sequence is referred to as each individual's
genotype. 1 "Genetic" assays, like tests for Sickle Cell Anemia,
Huntington's Disease, and Tay-Sachs Disease, have existed for many years
and are designed to identify which people have (or "carry") a specific form
of a gene in their cells. 15 By understanding whether they are carriers of a
gene, people can make more informed decisions as to potential medical risks
if they elect to conceive children.16
Over time, genes may develop specific mutations that impact the gene's
effectiveness in signaling for, or controlling the production of proteins,
enzymes, hormones, and other substances that are necessary to keep the
body healthy.' 7 Some of these mutated genes can, over a period of many
generations and under the influence of a myriad of population and
environmental factors, become common within families, ethnic groups, and
geographical regions. 18 Common gene variants are referred to as
"polymorphisms." 19 The combination of genes, together with their possible
11. Tom Hollon, Human Genes: How Many?, 15 SCIENTIST, Oct. 15, 2001, at 1;
Lincoln D. Stein, Human Genome: End of the Beginning, 431 NATURE 915, 915-16
(2004).
12. Hollon, supra note 11, at 1; Stein, supra note 11, at 915-16.
13. Assembly of DNA into Chromosomes, http://www.emunix.emich.edu/-rwinning
/genetics/chrom.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
14. Philip N. Benfey & Thomas Mitchell-Olds, From Genotype to Phenotype:
Systems Biology Meets Natural Variation, 320 SCIENCE 495, 495-97 (2008).
15. Ricki Lewis, A Brief History of Genetic Testing, SCI. PROGRESS, May 5, 2008,
http://www.scienceprogress.org/2008/05/a-brief-history-of-genetic-testing/.
16. See generally Wylie Burke, Genetic Testing, 347 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1867 (2002).
17. Alicia Mae Prater, Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms: Point Mutations Are Being
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polymorphisms within a species, is referred to as the species' genome. 20
Examples of several "genomic" tests that detect polymorphisms include
tests:
(1) measuring the number of gene copies present in a cell (such as the
DNA topoisomerase II(A), or the TOP2A gene in breast cancer
cells); 21 (2) detecting the presence of specific mutations in families of
related genes (such as the Cytochrome P450 drug metabolizing22
enzyme producing genes and pseudo-genes); and (3) assessing the
degree to which specific gene mutations are copied (transcribed) into
RNA or used (translated) to make proteins, such as the Allomap
Cardiac Allograft Gene Expression Profiling test system.
23
Within the broad family of genomic tests, methods that identify
polymorphisms can be used for a number of specific reasons. First, by
identifying the presence of genetic variations in metabolic pathways, they
can indicate how effectively drugs are likely to be metabolized, thereby
providing information on what quantity or dose of a drug a person should be
24given. Second, by identifying individuals by genetic makeup, these tests
can hint at which patients are likely to respond to a given family of drugs
because members of a drug family are likely to be metabolized by similar
20. NATIONAL CENTER FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION, A BASIC INTRODUCTION
TO THE SCIENCE UNDERLYING NCBI RESOURCES: WHAT Is A GENOME?, (Nat.'l Ctr. for
Biotechnology Infor., 2004), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer
/genetics genome.html.
21. Letter from Steven I. Gutman, Director, Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device
Evaluation and Safety, to Dana Olsen, Regulatory Affairs Specialist, Dako Denmark A/S
(Jan. 11, 2008), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrhdocs/pdf5/
P050045a.pdf.
22. Letter from Steven I. Gutman, Director, Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device
Evaluation and Safety, to James F. Kelly, Regulatory Affairs, Roche Molecular Systems,
Inc. (Dec. 23, 2004), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrhdocs/
pdf4/K042259.pdf.
23. 510(k) Substantial Equivalence Determination: Decision Summary, Assay and
Instrument Combination Template, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrhdocs/reviews
/K073482.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
24. Gutman Letter to James F. Kelly, supra note 22.
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pathways. 2 5 This information helps determine who should or should not be
treated. These methods are typically referred to as pharmacogenomic tests.
26
Carrying a specific gene (as detected by genetic tests) or having a specific
polymorphism (as detected by any of the genomic tests) may not alone,
however, predict disease. For example, in the same way that a person who
has the genes (i.e., genotype) for both blue and brown eyes will have brown
eyes because the "brown eye" gene is dominant, patients carrying different
genes and different polymorphisms for drug metabolism enzymes can
express different drug metabolism rates. 27 Which genes are "turned on,"
how effective they are in being copied and translated, and whether there are
other controlling genes present in the body that counteract the gene of
interest all control our "phenotype," or more accurately, how each individual
person in a population exists and is observed in relation to the rest of the
world.28
Within the scope of in vitro diagnostic, or "IVD" tests, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA, or the agency) and device users (clinical laboratories
and physicians) typically assess each assay's relative risks and benefits. 29
Risks include the potential for false positive or false negative results, as well
as the impact that an inaccurate result may have on the diagnosis of the
patient's disease or condition based on the incidence or frequency of the test
result in the general population. Benefits against which these risks are
weighed include gaining accurate diagnostic information about a patient's
25. Id.
26. See Noah, supra note 1, at 7-10.
27. ADELE PILLITTERI, MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH NURSING: CARE OF THE
CHILDBEARING & CHILDREARING FAMILY 160 (Lippincott Williams & Wilkins 2007)
(describing the general process by which eye color traits are inherited); Tommy
Andersson, et al., Drug-metabolizing Enzymes: Evidence for Clinical Utility of
Pharmacogenomic Tests, 78 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 559, 560 (2005)
(addressing how genetic variants in enzyme genes can impact drug metabolism rates).
28. Andersson, et al., supra note 27, at 560.
29. See CENTER FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF, ESTABLISHING THE PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF IN
VITRO DIAGNOSTIC DEVICES FOR THE DETECTION OR DETECTION AND DIFFERENTIATION OF
INFLUENZA VIRUSES 8-9 (FDA, 2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm071 458.pdf.
30. Id.
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health that can aid in their treatment. 31 In this way, risks and benefits of any
test are viewed as they relate to an individual always in the context of the
known risks for a general population.
Pharmacogenomic testing, however, shifts the risks and benefits
analysis. 32 While the risk of individual false positive and false negative
results still relate to the diagnosis of an individual patient, the result is not
analyzed in the context of what doctors know about populations or incidence
rates, but rather relates only and exclusively to whether this patient should or
should not be treated.33 In short, the risks and benefits are specific to the
patient alone.
1I. REGULATORY CONTROL PROCESSES
A. In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Device Manufacturers
1. FDA Premarket Approval or Clearance
FDA regulates diagnostic tests, including the specific, FDA cleared or
approved examples of genetic, genomic, pharmacogenomic, and phenotypic
tests listed above, as well as any product that measures individual
characteristics of human specimens (IVDs). 35 Some of the most common
characteristics of specimens that are currently tested include the presence or
absence of chemical substances, naturally occurring biological markers,
infectious disease agents, immunological responses to foreign substances,
and genetic components. Doctors, clinical laboratories, and, in limited
31. Id.
32. See Prebula, supra note 8, at 14; see also NATIONAL CENTER FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION, A SCIENCE PRIMER, JUST THE FACTS: A BASIC
INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE UNDERLYING NCBI RESOURCES: ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT
ALL: THE PROMISE OF PHARMACOGENONICS ( Nat.'| Ctr. for Biotechnology Info., 2004)
[hereinafter THE PROMISE OF PHARMACOGENONICS], available at
http://www.ncbi.nim.nih.gov/About/primer/pharm.html.
33. THE PROMISE OF PHARMACOGENONICS, supra note 32.
34. See supra notes 21, 22, 23.
35. See 21 C.F.R. § 809.3 (2009).
36. RANDY J. PREBULA, LABELING OF IN VITRO DIAGNOSTIC PRODUCTS, PROMOTION
OF BIOMEDICAL PRODUCTS 133 (Thomas E. Colonna & Jeffrey K. Shapiro, eds., Food and
Drug Law Inst., 2006).
2010
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cases, individuals in their own homes can use IVDs to assess hair, saliva,
blood, plasma, serum, urine, or other body fluids, to provide diagnostic,
prognostic, or therapeutic information about the current and/or future
medical state of the individual from whom the specimen was obtained.
37
FDA's definition of IVDs38 includes the chemical components of the test
(alone or combined with other components), the instruments and equipment
used to dispense, shake, incubate, and/or measure the results of the IVD
(with or without the associated chemicals), and systems that combine
chemicals and instruments into a single functional unit. 39 Irrespective of
where and by whom such tests are used, IVDs are regulated primarily as
medical devices by the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH),
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FDC)
Act.4"
37. Id.
38. 21 C.F.R. § 809.3 (2009). "In vitro diagnostic products are those reagents,
instruments, and systems intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions,
including a determination of the state of health, in order to cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent
disease or its sequelae. Such products are intended for use in the collection, preparation,
and examination of specimens taken from the human body." Id.
39. Id.
40. See Inter-Center Agreement Between the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research and the Center for Devices and Radiological Health,
http://www.fda.gov/CombinationProducts/Jurisdictionallnformation/ucm 121175.htm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2010); see also Overview of IVD Regulation,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/IVDRegulatoryAssi
stance/ucm123682.htm#2 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010). This regulation notes that some
IVDs are regulated as medical devices pursuant to the FDC Act by the Center for
Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER). Specifically, IVDs used in the diagnosis of
human retrovirus infection are regulated as class III devices for which CBER will require
a PMA approval application before they may be marketed in the United States.
Additionally, IVDs used in blood donor screening and/or blood banking applications are
regulated as biological products subject to section 351 of the Public Health Service Act
(PHS Act). These IVDs require licensure by CBER, rather than PMA approval, before
they may be marketed in the United States. Overview of IVD Regulation,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/IVDRegulatoryAssi
stance/ucm123682.htm#2 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
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FDA has classified most types of medical devices into one of three
classes--class 1, II, or 11.4 1 This classification is based on the combined
risks and benefits the devices present to patients and the general population
(both from the proper use of the device itself and the possible, but
reasonably recognized potential failures or misuses of the device).4 2 For
example, implantable devices that carry inherent, direct risks to patients as a
result of their use (such as spinal implants and ceramic hip products) are
class III devices, while sutures, clips, and staples (which, although
implantable, carry fewer risks to patients) are class I or II devices.
Similarly, diagnostic tests for fatal and highly contagious diseases, such as
HIV or tuberculosis, are class III devices because of the risk to health that
could occur if a test result were incorrect.44 Other tests that diagnose less
serious or non-contagious diseases (such as liver enzyme imbalances and
Lyme disease) are class II devices.45
41. JONATHAN S. KAHAN, MEDICAL DEVICE DEVELOPMENT: REGULATION AND LAW 3-
5 (Barnett International 2009).
42. Device Classification, FDA http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Device
RegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/default.htm (last visited Feb. 22,
2010) (offering examples and explanations for device classification levels); see also
Kahan, supra note 41, at 5.
43. See Device Classification, supra note 42; see also Letter from Celia M. Witten,
Director, Division of General, Restorative, and Neurological Devices, to Neal Defibaugh,
Director of Clinical Affairs, Smith & Nephew, Inc. (Dec. 17, 2004), available at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh docs/pdf3/P030022a.pdf and Letter from Donna-
Bea Tillman, Director, Office of Device Evaluation, to William Christianson, Vice
President of Clinical and Regulatory Affairs, DePuy Spine, Inc. (Oct. 26, 2004),
available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrhdocs/pdf4/P040006a.pdf (providing
examples of PMA approved ceramic hips and spinal implants).
44. See Device Classification, supra note 42; see also Letter from Hira L. Nakhasi,
Director, Division of Emerging and Transfusion Transmitted Diseases, to Marta Chase,
Bayer Corporation (Sept. 11, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
BiologicsBloodVaccines/BloodBloodProducts/ApprovedProducts/PremarketApprovalsP
MAs/ucm091275.pdf and Letter from Sally A. Hojvat, Director, Division of
Microbiology Devices, to Dan Bracco, Vice President of Clinical and Regulatory Affairs,
Oxford Immunotec, Inc. (July 30, 2008), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.
gov/cdrhdocs/pdf7/P070006a.pdf (demonstrating examples of PMA approved HIV and
Tuberculosis tests).
45. See Device Classification, supra note 42; see also 21 C.F.R. § 862.1050 (1997)
(demonstrating that liver enzyme assays are class II devices) and Letter from Sally A.
Hojvat, Director, Division of Microbiology Devices, to Fran White, Regulatory
2010
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FDA also uses the device classification as a mechanism to define the level
of controls necessary to reasonably assure product safety and effectiveness.46
General controls, which apply to all devices, include requirements for device
listing, premarket notification review, labeling, and compliance with FDA's
quality systems regulation (QSR).4 7 Class I devices are subject only to
general controls, unless they have been specifically exempted from these
requirements based on an FDA determination that the device type presents
little or no risk to patients.48 Special controls include written performance
standards, FDA-recognized voluntary international consensus standards for
specific kinds of products or product characteristics (such as sterilization
methods, electrical safety requirements, and biocompatibility), postmarket
surveillance requirements for adverse device events or patient injuries, and
FDA written guidance documents. 49 Class II devices are subject to both
general and special controls, and most require FDA premarket clearance (or
"510(k) Notice" clearance, as further discussed below). 50 However, they do
not typically require extensive clinical evaluation to demonstrate that the
product can be made consistently and work properly to meet its intended
purpose in a safe and effective manner.5' In addition to general and special
controls, FDA further requires manufacturers to demonstrate the safety and
efficacy of devices intended for life-sustaining or life-supporting purposes,
Consultant, MDC Associates, LLC (May 8, 2008), available at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrhdocs/pdf8/K080012.pdf (providing an example of
FDA's class II regulation of Lyme Disease tests).
46. Kahan, supra note 41, at 4.
47. Id.
48. See generally CENTER FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, NEW SECTION
513(F)(2) - EVALUATION OF AUTOMATIC CLASS III DESIGNATION, GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND CDRH STAFF (Ctr. for Devices and Radiological Health 1998), available
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/ucm080197.pdf. See also Kahan, supra note 41, at 9, 43-45.
49. Kahan, supra note 41, at 4, 20 (describing the three kinds of "controls and citing
the ability of company's to claim conformity to FDA recognized voluntary consensus
standards).
50. Id.; see also Device Classification supra note 42.
51. Section 513 Classification of Devices Intended for Human Use, 21 U.S.C. §
360c(a)(l)(C) (2009).
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high risk implants, and new, moderate-risk or high-risk devices that have not
been found substantially equivalent to legally marketed devices. 52 These
class III devices require a Premarket Approval (PMA) application and
successful completion of a preapproval inspection of the manufacturer's
facility and equipment to demonstrate compliance with QSR requirements.53
Thus, class III devices are the most stringently regulated.
Before a new device can be marketed, the manufacturer must obtain from
FDA either 510(k) premarket clearance or PMA approval. 54 However, if
there is a low level of known risks with the device, it may be exempt from
such requirements or be a candidate for an altemate submission.5 ' A 510(k)
notice includes: (1) a brief description of the new device, photographs and
engineering drawings; (2) draft promotional materials and labeling; (3)
identification of legally marketed products ("predicate devices") to which
the new device is "substantially equivalent;" (4) narrative and tabular
comparisons of the new device's and the predicate devices' intended use,
indications, technological characteristics, and principles of operation; (5)
software documentation (if the device uses software); (6) sterility
information (if sterile); (7) biocompatibility information; (8) statements or
declarations of conformance to applicable standards and guidance
documents; and, (9) summaries of any performance testing.56 In some cases,
laboratory and clinical testing may be required to support the 510(k)
notice.57
FDA reviews this documentation and issues an order either agreeing that
the new device is substantially equivalent to the predicate devices or stating
52. Kahan, supra note 41, at 4; see also Section 513 Classification of Devices
Intended for Human Use, 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2009).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (2009).
54. Device Classification, supra note 42. See also Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(k), 360e(a)-(b) (2009).
55. Device Classification, supra note 42.
56. Id.; see also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(k),
360e(a)-(b) (2009) and Kahan, supra note 41, at 75 (providing a complete list of the
elements required for a 510(k) submission).
57. Device Classification, supra note 42. See also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(k), 360e(a)-(b) (2009) and Kahan, supra note 41, at 75 (indicating
in the provided checklist that 510(k) submissions may include "bench, animal, and
clinical data").
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the reasons why the device is not substantially equivalent. 58 Substantial
equivalence means that the new device is intended for virtually the same
uses as the predicate devices and that it either has the same principles of
operation and technological characteristics as the predicates, or, if the new
device and the predicates do have differences, that such differences do not
raise any new questions of safety and effectiveness. 59  Importantly, a
substantial equivalence determination by FDA does not indicate FDA's
acceptance that the new device has been conclusively shown to be safe and
effective, but rather, it is a determination that the device is relatively similar
to another product so as to be sufficiently controlled and capable of being
safely sold for use. If FDA concludes that a device is not substantially
equivalent, the device is classified as a class III device that requires a PMA
(unless FDA agrees concurrently or soon thereafter to reclassify it into class
I or II due to the device's lack of risks compared to its relevant benefits and
uses).61
In a PMA application, FDA requires manufacturers to provide a complete
description of the device and its components, together with all of the
information typically required in a 510(k) notice and a detailed description
of the methods, facilities and controls used to manufacture the device,
training materials, and references to any standards relevant to the device's
safety and effectiveness. 62 FDA also requires the results of any and all
clinical trials, animal studies, and bench tests; published and unpublished
literature concerning the prior use of the product; and any other information
known to the manufacturer concerning the device's safety or effectiveness.
63
While a 510(k) notice must demonstrate that the device is substantially
58. Kahan, supra note 41, at 102-03.
59. Device Classification, supra note 42; see also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(k), 360e(a)-(b) (2009) and Kahan, supra note 41, at 56-57.
60. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (2009).
61. Id. at § 360c(a)(1)(C).
62. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c) (2009).
63. See FDA Regulations Guide, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Device
RegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/Premarket
ApprovalPMA/default.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2010); see also Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(k), 360e(a)-(b) (2009) and Kahan, supra note 41, at 242-
43 (listing the types of information requested by FDA in PMA submissions to support a
product's safety and effectiveness).
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equivalent to a predicate device, a PMA must demonstrate by valid scientific
evidence that the device is safe and effective.
64
3. Potential Impact of Shifting Risk/Benefit Paradigm
FDA's medical device regulations, as described above, are based
intrinsically on the risks and benefits a product has in relation to both the
patient and the general population. 65 A shift in risk/benefit from a general,
population-based approach to a narrower patient subgroup or individual
analysis in the pursuit of personalized medicine, therefore, is unlikely to lead
to any significant changes in regulatory structure. Put simply, the current
administrative framework, as it relates to the makers of test systems, appears
to be broad enough and flexible enough to encompass changing risk profiles.
This shift, however, could influence where a specific test may be placed
within the administrative framework. For example, a genomic test that
detects polymorphisms in Cytochrome P450 genes has already been
regulated as a class II medical device when it is used to advise doctors of the
likelihood that an individual patient may or may not be a fast metabolizer of
certain classes of drugs.66 The risks and benefits of the test are restricted by
the claims made in the product's labeling, which describe the test as:
intended for use in testing DNA [extracted from clinical samples] to
identify the presence or absence of human genotypic markers
encoding a drug metabolizing enzyme. The device is used as an aid in
determining treatment choice and individualizing treatment dose for
therapeutics that are metabolized primarily by the specific enzyme
about which the system provides genotypic information.
67
The claim is also limited by the clinical data in the labeling that explains
to users the purposes and limitations of the test. 68 If, hypothetically, a
company were to label the same test for use in directing whether a specific
patient should be treated with drug x, rather than drug y (based on her
weight, age, condition being treated, and genomic traits), it would appear to
have a different risk benefit profile. Specifically, if the test were correct, the
64. See FDA Regulations Guide, supra note 63; see also Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(k), 360e(a)-(b) (2009).
65. Kahan, supra note 41, at 4.
66. See Gutman Letter to James F. Kelly, supra note 22.
67. See id (emphasis added).
68. See id.
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doctor might choose to replace one possible, approved medical treatment
(with its own risks and benefits) with another drug (with different risks and
benefits) based solely on the diagnostic test result, rather than relying on the
test result "as an aid" in directing therapy or in helping the doctor reach a
conclusion as to the most appropriate treatment regimen. This potential
would appear to alter the risks to which patients may be exposed. By
changing the application of the test from a more general purpose to a
specific function that may increase patient risk because the results are
personalized, the FDA could choose to regulate the test at a higher level as a
class III assay to provide the agency an opportunity to assess the safety and
effectiveness of this new use in a PMA submission. Rather than shifting or
amending the regulatory framework, a change in underlying risks and
benefits could move a given product to a different location within the
preexisting schemes, thus requiring a heightened level of control and FDA
oversight.
B. Clinical Laboratories
1. FDA Premarket Enforcement Discretion
In 1976, Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments to the FDC
Act 6 9 to provide the regulatory framework by which medical devices,
including IVDs (as outlined above) can be marketed by medical device
manufacturers. 70 Nothing in the amendments, however, referred specifically
to clinical laboratories or the methods that laboratories could use to modify
existing products or develop in-house assays to analyze patient specimens as
a service on the order of a licensed healthcare provider. 7 1 Thus, in essence,
FDA's medical device regulations address the entities that make and sell
medical devices, but not the clinical laboratories and doctors who may
choose to modify or use the devices as they see fit within then existing state
regulatory frameworks for the practice of medicine.
In 1988, however, Congress enacted the Clinical Laboratory Improvement
72Amendments (CLIA), with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
69. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976).
70. Kahan, supra note 41, at 3.
71. DAVID FEIGAL, REGULATION OF GENETIC BASED THERAPY 3, 9 (Canary Press),
available at http://www.canaryfoundation.org/publications/Feigel.pdf (indicating that
FDA oversight of diagnostic tests arises under the 1976 Medical Device Amendments,
but that regulation of home brew diagnostic tests under FDA authority is "ambiguous").
72. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 201, (Oct.
31, 1988).
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(CMS) designated with the responsibility for implementing and enforcing
the CLIA regulations. The 1988 CLIA regulations require clinical
laboratories that modify marketed products or develop and conduct
diagnostic tests within the clinical laboratory to comply with specific assay
validation, quality assurance, quality control, and personnel proficiency
testing requirements that are highly likely to insure that the in-house
laboratory developed tests (also known as LDTs) are scientifically valid and74 ....
reproducible. Since LDTs, including genomic/personalized medicine test
methods developed and offered by a clinical laboratory, are developed in
accordance with CLIA regulations and performed by qualified individuals
who undergo routine proficiency testing, the tests have been generally
accepted as scientifically valid and reliable tools throughout the healthcare
system.
75
Although the development and use of LDTs (genomic or otherwise) by a
clinical laboratory are thus regulated pursuant to 42 C.F.R. Part 493, in
August 1992, FDA issued a draft Compliance Policy Guideline proposing to
apply general medical device regulation to these laboratory methods. 77 The
laboratory community objected (and continues to object), arguing that their
facilities are adequately regulated under CLIA, that the agency lacks legal
authority to regulate laboratory testing services, and that FDA regulation
would be duplicative of the well-defined and frequently reviewed CLIA
73. Id. at 3; see also Randy Prebula, & Jeffrey Shapiro, FDA's Regulation of
Analyte-Specific Reagents, Medical Device and Diagnostics Industry, MED. DEVICE &
DIAGNOSTIC INDUS., Feb. 2003, at 1.
74. See generally 42 C.F.R. Part 493 (2009) (describing, within the subparts, the
requirements by which clinical laboratories are expected to operate in the provision of
laboratory testing services).
75. See generally SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETIC TESTING,
ENHANCING THE OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SACGT
(NIH, 2000) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SACGT], available at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacgt/reports/oversightreport.pdf; see also Executive
Summary to the RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SACGT at vi; HHS, Establishment of the
Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,126
(Oct. 23, 2002).
76. See generally 42 C.F.R. Part 493, supra note 74.
77. See generally Prebula & Shapiro, supra note 73.
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requirements. 78 FDA withdrew its proposal, although the agency has
insisted since that time that it maintains authority to regulate LDTs should it
choose to do so. 79 Thus, from FDA's perspective, all LDTs are regulatable
diagnostic tests, although FDA chooses to exercise enforcement discretion to
allow most of these tests to be marketed solely on the basis of the clinical
laboratories' compliance with CLIA requirements. 80 As FDA made clear,
the agency recognized that "the use of in-house developed tests has
contributed to enhanced standards of medical care in many circumstances
and that significant regulatory changes in this area could have negative
effects on the public health." 81 FDA reasoned that "laboratories will be
responsible for both the quality and interpretation of results generated from
those tests." 82 Therefore, clinical laboratories can develop and offer
diagnostic tests to healthcare providers "outside the penumbra of FDA
oversight, to some degree."
83
Subsequent to the development of these FDA policies, however, the
agency observed that medical device manufacturers and clinical laboratories
could work in conjunction to attempt to circumvent premarket review of new
84IVDs. For example, as explained in the two FDA warning letters
described below, medical device manufacturers could develop and seek to
license their diagnostic test systems or technology to clinical laboratories,
and then claim that such tests were developed within the laboratories.
85
78. See generally RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SACGT, supra note 75; see also
Establishment of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society,
67 Fed. Reg. at 65, 126 (Oct. 23, 2002).
79. Analyte Specific Reagent Regulation, 62 Fed. Reg. 62, 243 (Nov. 21, 1997) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 809 and 864); Prebula & Shapiro, supra note 73, at 1.
80. Analyte Specific Reagent Regulation, 61 Fed. Reg. 10, 484 (proposed Mar. 14,
1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 809 and 864).
81. Analyte Specific Reagent Regulation, 62 Fed. Reg. 62, 249 (Nov. 21, 1997).
82. Id.
83. Bruce Pastner, New "'Home Brew" Predictive Genetic Tests Present Significant
Regulatory Problems, 9 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 237,239 (2009).
84. Analyte Specific Reagent Regulation, 61 Fed. Reg. at 10, 484; Analyte Specific
Reagent Regulation, 62 Fed. Reg. at 62,249.
85. Letter from Steven 1. Gutman, Director, Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device
Evaluation and Safety Center for Devices and Radiological Health, to Jeffrey R. Luber,
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In two recent examples of FDA enforcement actions against
manufacturers taking the approach described above with their assays and
CLIA laboratories, FDA determined that certain test systems being used by
the Laboratory Corporation of America (LabCorps) did not qualify as LDTs.
First, in FDA's October 11, 2007 warning letter to EXACT Sciences
Corporation, the agency established a boundary beyond which FDA viewed
the degree of cooperation between a medical device manufacturer and a
clinical laboratory when developing and/or validating an LDT as violative of
the standards in regards to LDTs.86 FDA's letter also provides an underlying
framework which can be used to evaluate the risks of FDA regulatory
oversight when a manufacturer and a CLIA-certified laboratory choose to
market a diagnostic test.87 In pertinent part, the agency's warning letter
advises:
Based on the information collected [during a CMS inspection of
LabCorp's facilities], FDA has determined that the [EXACT
Sciences'] PreGen-Plus assay [for colorectal screening] is a test that
was designed, developed, validated, and marketed by EXACT
Sciences rather than a test that was developed and validated by
LabCorp. As such, this device is not within the scope of laboratory
developed tests over which the agency has traditionally applied
enforcement discretion. For example, information collected at
LabCorp indicates EXACT has provided instructions for use,
validation information, and performance claims to LabCorp for the
PreGen-Plus assay. In addition, equipment and reagents that are
required for the test are specified by EXACT (and, in some cases,
provided by EXACT), including [equipment] for sample
preparation.
President, EXACT Sciences Corp. (Oct. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Gutman letter to Luber],
available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WamingLetters/2007/
ucm076536.htm; Letter from Steven 1. Gutman, Director, Office of In Vitro Diagnostic
Device Evaluation and Safety Center for Devices and Radiological Health, to David P.
King, President and Chief Executive Officer, Laboratory Corporation of America (Sept.
29, 2008) [hereinafter Gutman letter to King], available at http://www.fda.gov
/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WamingLetters/2008/ucm 1048114.htm.
86. See Gutman letter to Luber, supra note 85 and Gutman letter to King, supra note
85.
87. See Gutman letter to Luber, supra note 85.
88. Id.
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In the second, more recent example, FDA issued a September 29, 2008,
warning letter to LabCorp, stating that an ovarian cancer diagnostic test
89
offered by the clinical laboratory as an LDT is not in fact an LDT.
Specifically, FDA stated:
Based on the information collected, FDA has determined that the
OvaSureTM is a test that was designed, developed, and validated by
investigators at Yale University and not LabCorp. Instructions for use
and performance characteristics appear to have been developed by
Yale investigators. In addition, the materials being used to produce
this test including [redacted by FDA] and [redacted by FDA] are
manufactured by [redacted by FDA] based on specifications by the
workers at Yale. This device is not within the scope of laboratory
developed tests over which the agency has traditionally exercised
enforcement discretion.
90
Because both products described in these warning letters were not
developed or manufactured within the clinical laboratory for use as a service,
FDA viewed both tests as medical devices that were subject to agency
regulation.
91
In addition to these enforcement actions against manufacturers, FDA also
issued draft guidance indicating that the agency intends to enforce premarket
requirements over some tests developed wholly within clinical laboratories
(i.e. LDTs) when such tests combine multiple variables, are complex in
design, and when the process by which the test produces a clinical result is
neither transparent to, nor readily understood by, the healthcare provider
who orders the test.92 As described in the draft guidance document, in vitro
diagnostic multivariate index assays (IVDMIAs) are a category of clinical
laboratory developed assays that would be subject to FDA oversight. 93
Specifically, FDA defined IVDMIAs subject to FDA regulation as assays
that:
89. See Gutman letter to King, supra note 85.
90. Id.
91. See generally Pastner, supra note 83 and Analyte Specific Reagent Regulation,
62 Fed. Reg. 62, 249 (Nov. 21, 1997).
92. Draft Guidance for Industry, Clinical Laboratories, and FDA Staff on In Vitro
Diagnostic Multivariate Index Assays [hereinafter FDA Draft Guidance],
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Guidanc
eDocuments/ucm071455.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
93. Id.
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Combine the values of multiple variables using an interpretation
function to yield a single, patient-specific result (e.g., a
"classification," "score," "index," etc.), that is intended for use in the
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment or prevention of disease, andprovide a result whose
derivation is non-transparent and cannot be independently derived or
verified by the end user.
94
Rather than focusing on the reagents and materials used to develop the
assays, the relationship between the supplier of materials and the developing
clinical laboratory, or the instruments and analyzer systems used to perform
the assay, FDA's IVDMIA guidance focuses on how the LDT is used to
generate a result and whether the result is readily understandable by the
ordering physician in his position as a learned intermediary. 95 Once an LDT
is found to meet the criteria of an IVDMIA, FDA has indicated the agency's
intention to require 510(k) clearance or PMA approval for the assay,
dependin on the risks of the test when used for a specific diagnostic
purpose.
Overall, the various activities for which FDA has issued letters asserting
jurisdiction over LDTs, IVDs, or assay components have ranged from
distribution of kit systems claiming to be LDTs to the development of
complex and potentially risky devices by CLIA-certified laboratories, such
as the Pre-Gen test and the OvaSure test described above. 97 In retrospect, it
seems clear that FDA has thrown out a wide enforcement net in an attempt
to identify and focus on the activities of and relationships between both IVD
manufacturers and clinical laboratories that pose the greatest risk of potential
harm to public health. This is evident because the majority of products or
services that FDA's enforcement activity targeted are diagnostic tests that, in
the agency's view, are most likely to present a high risk to the patient, such




97. Gutman Letter to Luber, supra note 85; Gutman Letter to King, supra note 85.
98. Id. Letter from Larry D. Spears, Director, Office of Compliance Center for
Devices and Radiological Health, to Martin Madaus, President and CEO, Roche
Diagnostics Corporation (Jun. 11, 2003), available at http://www.fda.gov
/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WamingLetters/2003/ucm147916.htm; Untitled letter to
Correlogic (2004).
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level of scrutiny and concern will be applied to genomic LDTs remains to be
seen.
2. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments Requirements
Apart from possible regulation by FDA, CLIA regulates the laboratories
themselves. 99 Under the CLIA statute, a "laboratory" is defined as any
facility for the:
biological, microbiological, serological, chemical, immune-
ohematological, hematological, biophysical, cytological, pathological,
or other examination of materials derived from the human body for
the purpose of providing information for the diagnosis, prevention, or
treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the
health of, human beings. These examinations also include procedures
to determine, measure, or otherwise describe the presence or absence
of various substances or organisms in the body.
100
Under CLIA, clinical laboratories may modify existing "FDA-cleared or -
approved test[s]," or develop their own tests, provided that the laboratory
facility adhere to a number of specific requirements.
101
3. Potential Impact of Shifting Risk/Benefit Paradigm
Within the context of genomic tests, the greatest risk to clinical
laboratories appears to lie not in the process of developing or validating such
tests, but rather in the complexity of the test result and the medical impact
(i.e., the risks and benefits) of the LDT method. By seeking to make such
tests applicable to individual patients, the clinical laboratory may need to
include multiple variables and interpretive algorithms that are
99. 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (2009).
100. Id.
101. 42 C.F.R. § 493.1253 (b)(2) (2009). This regulation provides:
Each laboratory that modifies an FDA-cleared or approved test system, or
introduced a test system not subject to FDA clearance or approval (including
methods developed in-house and standardized methods such as text book
procedures), or uses a test system in which performance specifications are not
provided by the manufacturer must, before reporting patient test results,
establish for each test system the performance specifications for the following
performance characteristics, as applicable: (i) Accuracy; (ii) Precision; (iii)
Analytical sensitivity; (iv) Analytical specificity; (v) Reportable range of test
results for the test system; (vi) Reference intervals (normal values); and (vii)
Any other performance characteristic required for test performance.
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nontransparent to users or mathematically complex to yield a desired, single,
patient-specific result. Whether such a complex test continues to be viewed
as a laboratory service to healthcare providers (for which FDA will exercise
enforcement discretion), or as an IVDMIA clinical laboratory product that is
subject to full FDA regulation through either the 5 10(k) or PMA processes
may depend on the agency's and the clinical laboratories' understanding of
the product's risks and benefits to the user, the patient, and the general
population.
C. Doctors and Patients as Diagnostic Test Users
1. Current State of Regulation/Oversight
In addition to requirements for clinical laboratory licensure, many state
laws specify that clinical laboratories may only perform tests pursuant to an
order from a licensed physician or other individual authorized under state
law to request tests.10 2 Furthermore, they may only report test results to the
requesting physician or other individual authorized by law to receive the
results. 10 CLIA regulations require that tests be ordered by, and results sent
to, an "authorized person," but they defer to state law to determine who
qualifies as an "authorized person."' 0 4 Therefore, if a laboratory is licensed
by a state that limits who may order a test and who may receive test results,
the laboratory would need to comply with these requirements. For example,
Florida law provides that "a clinical laboratory may examine human
specimens at the request only of a licensed practitioner or other person
authorized by law to use the findings of clinical laboratory examinations.''
0 5
A "licensed practitioner" is defined as a physician, dentist, or nurse
practitioner licensed under Florida law.106 Under this approach, the doctor
ordering a test and the laboratory performing it do so primarily under their
state license authority, under which they would thus appear to be subject to
state tort risks for the products or services they offer.
102. Gail Javitt & Kathy Hudson, Federal Neglect: Regulation of Genetic Testing, 22
ISSUES 1N Sci. & TECH. 1, 62 (2006), available at http://www.dnapolicy.org
/resources/Issues inScience and Technology.pdf.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 63.
105. Id.
106. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 483.041(7) (2009).
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2. Potential Impact of Shifting Risk/Benefit Paradigm
The shift in risk/benefit analysis is unlikely to have any impact on the
process by which states directly regulate healthcare providers in their
licensing practices. How an individual doctor is trained to provide medical
services to patients and licensed by a state appears to be relatively immune
to the process by which individual patient risks and benefits are calculated,
although the process does appear to have a direct impact on the standard of
care the physician or healthcare provider offers to patients.
1 7
III. STATE TORT INFLUENCES
Just as in the area of regulatory controls (discussed above), more indirect,
non-administrative, tort-based influences appear to be uniquely attuned to
whether the potentially-liable entity: (1) manufactures products; 10 (2)
provides services; 109 and/or (3) sees patients within the context of a licensed
healthcare provider relationship. 110
A. In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Device Manufacturers
1. Current Mechanisms for Assigning Liability
Individual entities that manufacture and market products are traditionally
subject to a hybrid of strict liability and negligence in tort. 1 Specifically,
according to the standard set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
manufacturers of products may be held strictly liable for their product if and
107. See infra Section 111(a).
108. See Noah, supra note 1, at 24.
109. Id.
110. Noah, supra note 1, at 24 (noting numerous additional sources providing
examples of the "more exacting standards," including Bazel v. Mabee, 576 N.W.2d 385,
387 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a jury could find a physician negligent for using
Betadine despite knowledge of the patient's allergy); Lynch v. Bay Ridge Obstetrical &
Gynecological Assocs., 532 N.E.2d 1239, 1240 (N.Y. 1988) (allowing a claim against a
physician for negligently failing to diagnose plaintiffs pregnancy and then prescribing a
drug whose use was contraindicated early in pregnancy); Edward A. Marshall, Medical
Malpractice in the New Eugenics: Relying on Innovative Tort Doctrine to Provide Relief
When Gene Therapy Fails, 35 GA. L. REv. 1277, 1299-327 (2001) (arguing that
malpractice doctrines are likely to adapt to accommodate advances in gene therapy)).
11. See Noah, supra note 1, at 24.
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when it is "defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor ... and the
omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe."1 2 Alternatively, in states that have adopted the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, a manufacturer "who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer ... is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user"'' 3 simply on the basis of
placing the product commercially in the marketplace, provided that the
product reaches the user "without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold."''
14
The Restatement (Third) further provides that a product will be considered
defective due to inadequate warnings or instructions when the "foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by
the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other
distributor ... and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the
product not reasonably safe." 115 Thus, product purchasers may seek
damages based on the safety of the product, not on the reasonableness of the
conduct of the manufacturer. 1
6
The general standard applicable to products is modified, however, in
relation to prescription drugs and medical devices, where the plaintiff must
establish that "the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the ... medical device
are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that
reasonable healthcare providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks, would
not prescribe the ...medical device for any class of patients. '1 7 As to
prescription medical devices regulated by FDA, one can hypothesize that
plaintiffs seeking to establish a defective product would need to demonstrate
that the foreseeable risks of use so dramatically outweigh any potential
benefits that doctors would fail to prescribe the test to any class of patients,
let alone to any individual patient.
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(b) (2008).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) (1965).
114. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)(b) (1965).
115. Id. at § 2(c) (2008); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) (1965).
116. 72A C.J.S. § 6, at 17(2004).
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6(c) (2008).
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Within the context of pharmacogenomic tests, however, the manufacturer
may be strictly liable to the individual who receives an incorrect test result
through a failure to warn claim."18 Specifically, a:
prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
inadequate instructions or warnings [and a manufacturer may thus be
liable] if reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable
risks of harm are not provided to: (1) prescribing and other health-
care providers who are in a position to reduce the risks of harm in
accordance with the instructions or warning; or (2) the patient when
the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that health-care
providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in
accordance with the instructions or warnings.
119
The manufacturer has several available defenses, as described below, to a
failure to warn claim. First, the manufacturer can argue that it should have
no duty to warn a laboratory of the risk of an erroneous test result beyond
the adequate prescribing information within the product labeling. In
essence, FDA approval of the device labeling as a comprehensive and
accurate statement of the clinical utility and limitations of the test should
mean that the clinical laboratory will likely already know that such errors
can lead to adverse test results, because, as noted in The Restatement (Third)
of Torts:
[i]n general, a product seller is not subject to liability for failing to
wam or instruct regarding risks and risk-avoidance measures that
should be obvious to, or generally known by, foreseeable product
users. When a risk is obvious or generally known, the prospective
addressee of a warning will or should already know of its
existence. 121
Even though a manufacturer may not be required to provide clinical
laboratories with a warning, it should nonetheless consider providing an
118. Id at § 6(d) (2008).
119. Timothy A. Pratt & John F. Kuckelman, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine And
Direct-To-Consumer Advertising Of Prescription Drugs, 51 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS.
Q., Fall 2000, at Q. 17, available at http://www.thefederation.org/documents/Fall00.htm.
120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2, cmt. (j) (2008); Nat. Gas Odorizing, Inc. v.
Downs, 685 N.E.2d 155, 164 (Ind. App. 1997) (defining the sophisticated user doctrine
as one which exempts manufacturers from the duty of providing product users with a
warning when the user's knowledge of potential hazards posed by the product is equal or
superior to the manufacturer's knowledge).
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2, cmt. (j) (2008).
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adequate warning in order to reduce its risk of liability. An adequate
122
warning can serve as an affirmative defense to liability. Plaintiffs,
however, often argue that a particular warning was inadequate because it
should have been worded differently. 123 Thus, a pharmacogenomic test
manufacturer should scrutinize carefully the language of any proposed
warning.1
24
In relation to a medical device manufacturer, one also should consider that
the test is being sold to a trained professional who is using that product,
prescribing the product, or ordering that the test be provided to a patient
wholly within the physician's or the clinical laboratory's provision of a
medical service. As such, the manufacturer could assert that the product is
used only under the direction of a learned intermediary and that the test is
only used by a sophisticated user. 125 The learned intermediary doctrine
similarly appears to apply when a product's warnings and instructions are
provided to a physician who stands between the manufacturer of the test and
the patient. 126 In the sophisticated user defense, if the clinical laboratory
using the test knew or reasonably could have been expected to know about
the product's injury-causing risks, the manufacturer or distributor has no
duty to warn the product's end user.127
122. See Lowe v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 206 F. Supp.2d 1195, 1201 n.4 (S.D. Ala.
2002) (stating that under Alabama law, proof of a warning issued by the manufacturer is
an affirmative defense since the user who was made aware of the dangers inherent in
using the product assumed the risk of injury from these dangers by using the product
anyway).
123. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2, cmt. (i) (stating that, when assessing
the adequacy of warnings, courts should consider a number of factors, including the
"content and comprehensibility, intensity of expression, and the characteristics of
expected user groups"); see also Strong v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682,
686-87 (C.A. Neb. 1981) (stating that there is "no duty to warn if the user knows or
should know of the potential danger, especially when the user is a professional who
should be aware of the characteristics of the product").
124. Id.
125. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF TORTS § 6(d)(1) (2008).
126. Id.
127. Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Sup. Ct., 221 Cal.App.3d 1601, 1621 (1990).
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2. Potential Impact of Shifting Risk/Benefit Paradigm - How learned
is the intermediary or sophisticated is the user?
In relation to medical device manufacturers, one must consider that the
test is being sold to a trained professional (the doctor) who is using the
product, prescribing the product, or ordering that the test be provided to a
patient wholly within his or the clinical laboratory's provision of a medical
service. As such, the person best suited to protect the patient from a
defective product, best able to assess the risks and benefits of any medical
course of action and who bears liability for unreasonable uses of the test is
the physician. 128 Similarly, under the sophisticated user defense, whereby
the risks associated with a complex product lie with the knowledgeable and
highly trained users of the product, rather than the device manufacturer, a
manufacturer may be shielded from products liability due to defective
labeling or warnings.' 29 In either event, the manufacturer's labeling and the
sale of the device to a sophisticated user should "shield manufacturers from
liability for disclosed risks ...because the mere presence of the warning
tends to shift liability to physicians."
'' 30
In shifting the riskibenefit analysis from populations to individuals, the
learned intermediary doctrine 131 would appear to weaken the device
manufacturer's defenses only to the extent that the learned intermediary is
incapable of standing between the manufacturer and the patient. This impact
could develop if the test method is overly complex or because the risks and
benefits of the test method cannot be adequately communicated in the device
labeling. Pharmacogenomic tests often are highly complex and, as a result,
it is unclear just how learned any learned intermediary can be. Absent the
interposition of the doctor, liability could revert to the manufacturer.
Similarly, sophisticated users, such as clinical laboratories who develop
tests for their own use (as described above), may well understand how to
perform complex tests, but they may not have a thorough understanding of
the limitations or controls under which the results must be reported to be
meaningful. If this defense also is unavailable to manufacturers, it raises the
potential that the complexity of the test methods could limit their available
defenses. As noted below, however, any shift in risk/benefit balancing that
128. PROSSER, WADE, & SCHWARTZ, TORTS 763 (1 1th ed. 2005).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388(k).
130. Barbara J. Evans & David A. Flockhart, The Unfinished Business of U.S. Drug
Safety Regulation, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 51-52 (2006).
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6(d)(1) (2008), supra note 125.
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leads to a higher regulatory burden (i.e., PMA as opposed to a 5 10(k) notice)
simultaneously decreases possible state tort implications by opening the
possibility for federal preemption.
32
3. Limitations Imposed by FDC Act Preemption (Reigel v. Medtronic
(2008))
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Medtronic v. Lohr
133
that clearance of a pacemaker through the 510(k) process did not lead to
federal preemption of possible state tort actions.1 34 Because the pacemaker
wires in Lohr had not been found to be safe and effective (as would be the
case for a device approved through the PMA process), the plaintiff was able
to recover in tort for an injury caused by a defective pacemaker wire
(whether negligently designed, defectively manufactured, or defective due to
inadequate warnings) when the wire failed and the patient underwent
emergency surgery. 35 In Lohr, the Court, however, left open the question as
to whether the same analysis would apply to products approved through the
PMA process. 36
In February 2008, the Court addressed this issue directly in Reigel v.
Medtronic, 3 7 where it held that "[t]he [1990 Medical Device Amendments
of the FDC Act]'s pre-emption clause bars common-law claims challenging
the safety or effectiveness of a medical device marketed in a form that
received premarket approval from FDA."' 138 In Riegel, "Charles Riegel and
his wife, petitioner Donna Riegel, brought suit against respondent Medtronic
after a Medtronic catheter ruptured in Charles Riegel's coronary artery
during heart surgery."' 39 Within this context, and as described above, any
132. See infra, subsection 3 & note 137 (describing Federal preemption under Riegel
v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 999 (2008)).
133. Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 470 (1996).
134. Id. at497-501.
135. Id. at 481.
136. Id. at 493, 503.
137. Reigel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 999, 999 (2008).
138. Id. at 1001.
139. Id.
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shift in the classification of a medical device, such as a pharmacogenomic
test, into class III due to a balancing of individual patient risks would
simultaneously place a product into a category where the manufacturer
would be free under the Riegel analysis from common-law claims
challenging the safety or effectiveness of the test method.
B. Clinical Laboratories
1. Current Bases for Liability
In relation to products liability as a cause of action, "sellers of products
face strict liability in tort, while providers of services generally do not."
140
Because clinical laboratories have historically been viewed by FDA and
CMS as service providers, any basis for liability on the part of the laboratory
would likely need to be established, for example, by negligence in the
reasonable provision of medical services. This could be demonstrated by
evidence that the laboratory mishandled or misidentified specimens in a way
that could lead to inaccurate test results being reported to doctors and
patients. Alternatively, hypothetical claims of negligent infliction of
emotional distress, or even of an intentional tort (such as intentional
infliction of emotional distress by extreme and outrageous conduct that
intentionally or recklessly causes a patient victim severe mental stress) may
arise under specific facts or situations. As a general matter, however, the
clinical laboratory would not be subject to the same basis in strict liability
simply by offering to conduct a requested, medically ordered test.
2. Potential Impact of Shifting Risk/Benefit Paradigm
The shift in risk/benefit analyses for pharmacogenomic tests, however,
creates a conundrum for the laboratories by blurring lines between services
and products. FDA views IVDMIAs (the subset of clinical laboratory-
developed tests where the results are complex and not readily transparent or
intelligible to doctors) as products, not services, and seeks to regulate them
as such. 14 1 From a tort law perspective, this shift also appears to create the
possibility that laboratory development of test services could be viewed as
the creation and sale of a product, where strict products liability applies. If
such a test is viewed as a product, not a service, and marketed by the clinical
laboratory without FDA approval, the clinical laboratory would appear to
have increased the likelihood of potential state tort oversight, without
140. See Noah, supra note 1, at 24.
141. See FDA Draft Guidance, supra note 92.
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simultaneously benefitting from any federal preemption that would apply if
the test were FDA approved through the PMA process.
C. Malpractice and Liability - the Physician-Patient Relationship in
Personalized Medicine
1. Current Bases for Liability - Medical Malpractice/Negligence
As a licensed healthcare provider, doctors generally are not subject to tort
liability as a product manufacturer. Rather, tort law uses the less exacting
standards of medical malpractice to resolve personal injury claims arising
from surgical and other medical procedures. Courts have held physicians
liable for the negligent selection of prescription drugs, including cases
involving inadequate testing for the selection of the best available drug for a
particular patient. In addition, pharmacists may face tort liability for
mistakes in compounding drugs, but they generally escape strict liability
because courts regard them as providers of a service rather than sellers of a
product.
1 42
As such, if a doctor chooses to order a new pharmacogenomic test, or to
use the results of such tests in the management of a patient's care, that
choice would usually be reviewed in the context of the professional standard
of care by which any medical treatment, diagnostic method, or therapeutic
intervention is assessed. If the doctor tests a patient adequately, within the
reasonable professional standard of care using tests shown by the
manufacturer, the clinical laboratory, or by peer-reviewed publication to be
reasonably reliable in providing meaningful clinical results, the doctor's
exposure to potential malpractice-based liability would appear to be
minimal. Failure to test a patient with readily available and easily
understood, reliable test methods, however, may not meet the requisite
standard of professional care.
2. Potential Impact of Shifting Risk/Benefit Paradigm
In shifting the risk/benefit analysis, changing the specificity and clinical
utility of any test method from broad patient populations to individual
142. Noah, supra note 1, at 24 (noting numerous additional sources providing
examples of the "more exacting standards," including Bazel v. Mabee, 576 N.W.2d 385,
387 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a jury could find a physician negligent for using
Betadine despite knowledge of the patient's allergy); Lynch v. Bay Ridge Obstetrical &
Gynecological Assocs., 532 N.E.2d 1239, 1240 (N.Y. 1988) (allowing a claim against a
physician for negligently failing to diagnose plaintiff's pregnancy and then prescribing a
drug whose use was contraindicated early in pregnancy)); Marshall, supra note 110, at
1299-327 (arguing that malpractice doctrines are likely to adapt to accommodate
advances in gene therapy).
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patients, increasing the complexity of the test method, and reducing the
ability of the healthcare provider to understand and apply the test results to a
single patient's condition, issues are raised as to what is the reasonable
standard of care. How can a doctor be aware of the risks of his actions if the
process by which a result is obtained or the true clinical import of a result is
not readily apparent? Can the true clinical nature of an individual patient
result devoid of population based risk/benefit balancing be meaningful to his
or her healthcare provider? In brief, a doctor may not be capable of meeting
the requirements of providing professional care if the standard cannot be
readily determined or if it shifts on the sands of undefined, amorphous
risk/benefit calculations.
CONCLUSION
There are multiple administrative controls and tort influences in place that
impact the approval, marketing, and use of diagnostic tests. These complex
and overlapping control mechanisms, despite their common basis in
user/patient risks and benefits, disparately impact manufacturers, clinical
laboratory service providers, doctors, and patients. The interplay between
the available control mechanisms is heightened, and may lead to
unanticipated shifts in regulatory oversight and manufacturer liability, when
viewed through the lens of novel, pharmacogenomic test methods. Due to a
shift in the mechanism by which general risk benefit analyses move toward
the individual patient's personalized medical treatment, manufacturers of
diagnostic tests may find that FDA exercises greater regulatory scrutiny over
their tests as class III devices, rather than through less rigorous pathways.
Clinical laboratories may find the shift to personalized medicine-based risk
profiles will create yet another avenue by which FDA oversight will be
applied to their laboratory services, while both clinical laboratories and
ordering physicians are likely to see a blurring of the lines between services
and products, thus impacting the tort influences to which they are exposed
and the sources of liability to which they may be held.
